INTRODUCTION

On 26 April 1937 General Franco's German and Italian allies in the Spanish Civil
War (1936) (1937) (1938) (1939) pounded the Basque town of Guernica. In the furore triggered by the aerial bombardment, the United Kingdom (UK) government granted permission for British activists from the Basque Children's Committee (BCC) to evacuate nearly 4,000 children from the Basque Country to the United Kingdom. For the first time since 1914, His Majesty's Government (HMG) offered sanctuary to groups in danger of their lives and bereft of private means. Significantly, too, the evacuation of these youngsters broke new ground for a country that could boast precious little tradition of offering refuge to minors. For historians Tony Kushner and Katharine Knox the evacuation marks one of the great chapters in the unfolding of the refugee crisis of the twentieth century. 1 We enjoy many fine studies both of the watershed evacuation effort and the battle for repatriation launched by the Francoists after they had definitively conquered the Basque Country on 2 July 1937. 2 These works, however, focus most of all on the danger of front-line bombing, refugee work or the domestic British political context. This approach has left three areas awaiting greater study. First of all, the concentration on bombing means that historians have neglected the role played by controversy over violence behind the lines in both the evacuations and calls for repatriation. Secondly, the repatriation literature centres on the actions of the British activists who resisted Francoist efforts to return children to Spain. As a result, the role of British rightists in backing the repatriation campaign deserves much deeper study if we are to better understand the Basque refugee issue. Thirdly, historians have tended to view the impact of the Spanish Civil War on the United Kingdom through the lens of British politics rather than the entangled relationship between rightist groups in England and in Francoist Spain.
The articleshows that the struggle over the Basque children became so important not simply because of the bombing of Guernica, but also because the youngsters grew into symbols of Francoist violence behind the lines. This repression was long silenced and it is timely to place the history of the children fully in this context. The controversy about evacuation and repatriation also became wrapped up in a battle for control of the children's minds or souls. This struggle to form children is gaining growing attention in the Spanish and wider European historiography and it is also timely to place the young Basque refugees in this context. The historian Ricard
Vinyes, for instance, argues that the Francoist authorities anticipated that a good proportion of children repatriated to Spain would belong to parents who had perished, suffered imprisonment, exile or poverty. These children, therefore, stood in great danger of passing into Francoist care homes. Vinyes further argues that parents who had backed the government against Franco and whose children went into such care lost their right to bring them up according to their convictions. Although historians have not examined the repatriation struggle though this lens before, controversy over this very danger sat at the heart of the repatriation dispute. 3 Importantly, British advocates of repatriation became entangled in these Spanish conflict as they became immersed in a battle for control of youngsters that pitched sections of the right against the centre and left in both Spain and the UK.
SYMBOLS AND SOULS
The controversy over the evacuation and repatriation of Basque children emerged from a long conflict for control of children and their development as emblems of innocence. At the start of the nineteenth century, children formed economically valuable contributors to family income whose poor life expectancy made it emotionally difficult for parents to forge bonds with them. As survival rates improved and schooling became compulsory, better off parents could afford to invest in their children who they increasingly regarded as emotionally priceless. In this environment, towards the late nineteenth century in Spain, as in other parts of the world, a cult of childhood developed as anthropologists, psychologists, educational theorists and legislators across the political spectrum pointed to the particular vulnerability of children, the need to protect them from a potentially corrupting environment and to preserve their innocence by delaying their entry into the pernicious adult world. 4 Spaniards kept a keen eye on such developments and in the early twentieth century enacted a series of laws that reserved special protection for children. The Church had long run care homes for children and during the nineteenth century the state too began to provide some social services. From 1918, however, and inspired by perceived best practice abroad, state care grew steadily more important through a system of children's courts (Tribunales Tutelares de Menores). These courts sought to reform rather than punish children and relied on a number of their own care homes, medical experts and social workers who could help them oversee the reshaping of the child.
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Officials concerned for the health and vigour of the future nation also founded a series of rural holiday, educational and recuperation homes for children known as colonies. 6 Using such state institutions, officials began to take children into care from parents they deemed morally unfit and whose homes they believed constituted a dangerous environment for the future stock of the nation. Under the authoritarian rule of General During the Civil War, the battle for children's souls and minds that sat at the heart of the evacuation and repatriation controversy grew more acute. Teachers on government side, for instance, sought to turn children into free-thinking and selfconscious proletarians who would oppose fascism and reject Church dogma. The Francoists also saw themselves as fighting a tremendous battle for the soul of children. As the Francoist school inspector Alfonso Iniesta put it while they propose the supposed respect for the child's conscience, we see the need for dogma…against their theories of rational paganism, we affirm the faith. 10 Francoists widely shared this view. and whose murder the Francoists had tried to keep quiet. 25 In his speech Aguirre also highlighted the large numbers of refugees who had entered his government's territory after they had fled the violence. The scale of the refugee problem proved humiliating for his opponents. When the Francoists occupied San Sebastián in the autumn of 1936, for instance, only 12,000 of its 80,000 inhabitants remained with the rest taking flight. On the back foot, Francoists claimed that the vast bulk of these refugees had fled not because they were petrified by Francoist violence behind the lines, but because government forces obliged them at gunpoint to leave behind their homes and livelihoods. 26 The flight of innocent children, and especially Basque children, and their growing importance as symbols of atrocities became particularly disconcerting for the Francoists. By December 1936, the regional Basque government had evacuated 30,000 children from areas about to fall to the Francoists. They housed many of these child refugees in the government zone in a network of colonies which generated significant public interest and came under the control of teachers dedicated to turning them into self-conscious proletarians. 27 The Francoist school inspector and propagandist on child policy Alfonso Iniesta also accused the government of carrying out similar evacuations from Madrid to spread a series of black legends about the murderous nature of the insurgents. In the government zone, he charged, the press claimed that children in Francoist territory witnessed almost daily executions in the street. For Iniesta, such acts formed part of a propaganda campaign that also saw children prised from the arms of their parents on the false pretence of danger. 28 Similarly, the Jesuit propagandist the Reverend Father Isidoro Gríful argued that
Franco's opponents on the government side sent letters to refugee children describing 'horrific and fantastic crimes committed, they said, by the Nationalists [insurgents]
against members of their own families.' He held too that some children had been convinced that their 'parents had been barbarously murdered by the Nationalists, even though this was not the case'.
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THE BOMBING OF BILBAO AND THE CONTROVERSY OVER EVACUATION
Tensions over the control of children and discomfort with their power as symbols of
Francoist atrocities came to a head with the bombing of the Basque town of Guernica.
The bombing hit the headlines of papers around the world after foreign reporters led by George Steer of The Times exposed the attack on the civilian population. Many observers feared the bombardment marked a watershed and anticipated the horror awaiting Europe's major cities should another war between the major powers break out. 30 Keen to protect the purity of their crusade, and mindful of the need to fight according to the rules of war if they were to secure much-needed belligerent rights, the
Francoists moved quickly to deny that they had carried out the bombing. Luis Bolín took charge of the cover up and he and his acolytes argued the 'Reds' had set fire to the town and that insurgent planes had not flown on that day. 31 Despite the long-since-disproved denials, children stood out as symbols of the horror of terror against the civilian population and their testimony could prove devastating for the Francoists. One of the youngsters eventually evacuated to the United Kingdom, for example, gave the following testimony to a British supporter of the
Republic
[t]he planes, five of them, circled round us for about twenty minutes on and off. We hear the machine-gun rattle, but they didn't hit us. We saw terrible things...We saw a family of people we knew from our street run into a wood.
There was the mother with two children and the old grandmother. The planes circled about the wood for a long time and at last frightened them out of it.
They took shelter in a ditch. We saw the old granny cover up the little boy with her apron. The planes came low and killed them all in the ditch, except the little boy. He soon got up and began to wander across a field, crying. They got him too. 32 The dispute over evacuation developed in this febrile atmosphere. 41 Francoists argued they had offered to set up a safe zone for civilians that made the evacuations unnecessary, but the UK government concluded this was both an insincere and impractical suggestion it chose not to pursue. 42 Crucially, the Francoists felt the evacuation brought unwelcome attention and propaganda to both atrocities and efforts to capture children's souls taking place behind their lines. The Francoist press, for instance, complained that the 'Reds' bundled 'Spanish' children abroad wielding what they described as the false accusation that if the youngsters did not escape they would have their throats cut to slake the blood lust of 'fascist criminals'. 43 The authorities also claimed leftists were maintaining that the real reason for the evacuation was the 'fascist danger' and that parents preferred to keep their children abroad rather than allow them to become exposed Francoist doctrines and practices.
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Capturing the souls of the evacuated children did indeed stand at stake for Spanish
Francoists and their conquest of Bilbao gave them the opportunity to control the offspring of their enemies. Múgica's replacement as Bishop of Vitoria, for instance, claimed that the evacuated children were Christians and it was the duty of the Church to bring them back to Spain from the care of those abroad who supported the Spanish government. 45 A member of the team the Francoists put together to repatriate the children using the state institutions for child care developed earlier in the century, Isidoro Gríful, further argued that the children had already been corrupted by the politics of their families and by the revolution taking place in the 'Red zone'. But he also held that the separation from their families took place as part of a scheme to make it easier for the children to succumb to the 'revolutionary virus'. He further contended that in the children's colonies revolutionaries were educating the youngsters and turning them against society and the faith. In order to win back the souls of these children it was necessary to separate them from this pernicious environment and bring them back to the Fatherland. 46 As Antonio Maseada, head of
Franco's repatriation service, put it 'our sacred mission is to recover for God and
Spain the souls of these children who have been poisoned for so many years by antiCatholic and anti-patriotic ideas'.
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In the UK Archbishop Hinsley was also dissatisfied with the Catholic children he had felt obliged to take into his care. In August 1937, for instance, he contended that the evacuations had taken place 'from motives of a political nature', which was shorthand for trying to incriminate the Francoists in atrocities. 48 Unlike the Francoists, who wanted to gain control of Spaniards lost to their enemies, however, he aspired to rid himself of foreign children he considered a threat to Catholic values. He had discovered that the ostensibly Catholic children in his care had lived in, and absorbed, the highly politicised atmosphere of war-time Bilbao and the Basque Country. This led him to conclude that many of the children had arrived not as part of his flock but instead 'tainted with communism'. 49 Even worse, in a British Catholic strain of thinking that directly echoed the Francoist line, were those children under the care of 'Red families'. These children, some Catholics claimed, were being turned into 'little reasons for press for repatriation. Initially the children had disembarked for a threemonth period. As time passed, he grew more concerned about the £500 to £600 his Church spent each week maintaining its share of the refugees. Catholics in the UK and on 2 July an article also appeared in The Catholic Herald asking why the children were still being kept in the UK when Bilbao 'is now normal and in a state of security and plenty'. Accordingly, the paper argued there could be no reason to stop the children returning. 53 This would become the steadfast position of the British repatriation lobby and rested on the assumption that the end of front-line fighting meant that parents were now safe from physical and economic repression.
The argument also lay on the belief that Francoist-controlled children's homes were normal institutions. As we shall see, Franco's opponents rejected all these assumptions. They feared many parents had suffered execution, imprisonment and economic marginalisation or had gone into exile and were frequently in no position to care for their children. Opponents also believed that parents would not wish their offspring to end up in Francoist care where they would be brought up in the values they had struggled against.
On 12 July, Sturrup received instructions from Castaño to ignite his campaign while the Falange in Bilbao began to press parents whose identity they knew to petition for the return of their children. 54 The Falangist press in Spain and sections of the Catholic media in the United Kingdom now combined forces. The Falangist Diario Vasco invited parents to send names of their children to the editors who would forward them to the offices of The Universe in London. Here staff would put in train arrangements for their repatriation. As the Francoist press boasted, 'Catholic bishops of the United Kingdom are prepared to cooperate in bringing about immediate repatriation'. 55 The
Catholic Herald also offered up to £1,000 to help cover the costs of repatriation. 56 Meanwhile, Falangist newspapers in insurgent Spain pressed ahead with a propaganda campaign to bring back the children. La Voz de España proclaimed on 16 July that the parents whose children the 'Red separatists' had torn from their arms should make themselves known. As the campaign developed, the Francoists lambasted the pernicious environment being made in the UK for the children. They alleged that their guardians sent the child refugees to political meetings where they were presented as symbols of Francoist atrocity. They further claimed that this propaganda work went to such extremes that some children were led to believe the Francoists had murdered their parents. 57 The Francoists then added another series of accusations about the nature of the evacuation to the charge sheet. The parents had not been told where their children were living, their offspring were ill fed, poorly clothed and housed in miserable conditions. 58 It is true that the children very much feared their parents would be slaughtered behind the lines and indeed many became deeply upset when they heard Bilbao had fallen and in good measure because they feared for their parents' safety. 59 But the other accusations all stand disproven. 60 The PNV also exploited the issue to launch a propaganda campaign which would eventually draw in the BCC A captured party document revealed that the PNV's
London office alone boasted eight expert writers and some skilled lobbyists who exploited atrocities and the fate of children to the hilt. 61 From early August, the PNV urged parents in exile whose children had been evacuated overseas to write objecting to the swift repatriation of their children. It had soon garnered 650 parents'
signatures. 62 In a few months, thousands of parents had written to the PNV. 63 In Barcelona, where many Basque parents had fled, the PNV ensured that the press printed names of children and asked parents to write directly to the BCC in London instructing that their children 'don't move from England' in order to 'block this fascist manoeuvre'.
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The BCC soon became embroiled in this transnational dispute that put Francoist violence centre-stage. On12 July, the BCC informed HMG that it would support repatriation 'if conditions are suitable' and that it could be established the parents wanted their children back 'without any pressure being brought to bear upon them'.
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A measure of political sympathy came into play here as the BCC also wanted to resist repatriation because the PNV had sent the children as the legitimate government and to return them to Franco would amount to recognition of his regime. October 1937. In her missive she outlined her belief that before the children were repatriated the Committee required proof that the parents wished to see their children returned and evidence of the ability of families to care for their children. Atholl feared that if this were not done, children could be sent to people who were not their parents.
She also worried that the child refugees could return to find their parents in exile. In a nod to the role of the BCC in the battle of children's minds she also feared they could be sent back to an education system designed to 'rectify the ideas in which they had been brought up' or be placed in Francoist orphanages and brought up as Fascists.
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The charge had real resonance for many parents who had supported the government and loathed the prospect that their offspring could end up being educated in Francoist ideas. Female prisoners, for instance recoiled at the knowledge that they could be separated from their young children by prison staff who argued that their young ones required 'redeeming from the nefarious education given to them by their infidel parents'. 
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By contrast, British supporters of repatriation proved sympathetic to the argument that the children were being corrupted in the UK and to the Francoist assertion that their souls could be better protected in Spain. They also argued that Francoist care homes provided safe environments for the children. For these reasons they contended that it would be easier for the children's parents to be found if the children were sent back to
Spain regardless of whether the parents had requested their return. 75 They also pushed for the children to be sent to care homes if necessary and contended that Francoist social welfare organisations 'were efficient and could be trusted not to discriminate in their treatment of the children on account of the acts or politics of their parents'. Hinsley's representative on the BCC, contended, however, that children of parents who could not be identified should be returned to Spain and be 'handed over to General Franco's representatives'. 79 In early August, the BCC informed Hinsley that the parental applications they had received appeared of 'doubtful authenticity'. 80 To overcome such problems, the BCC, which could not gain Francoist approval to send its own representative to the Basque Country, hoped to verify applications through a representative from the Quakers bound for Bilbao. Difficulties included the parents' address not being provided, the applicants omitting the identification number given by the Basque authorities to evacuated children and mistakes spelling children's names. The committee also had other reasons for fearing malpractice. One woman wrote from France explaining her husband had been imprisoned in Laredo jail and insisting that 'under no circumstances does she wish the six children to return to rebel territory without her'. 90 All of this meant that the BCC was deeply aware of the danger that children could be sent back to 'people who were not their parents'. The BCC also feared that there would be 'no guarantee how they [the children] might be treated and that the 'real parents' could later write to them from France or Catalonia.
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In order to fight and marginalise the BCC, Franco's representative in London, the Duke of Alba, working hand in hand with Hinsley, had by 2 October set up a proxy
Repatriation Committee (RC). Founded at Hinsley's residence, the RC was made up of British personalities and was chaired by the Duke of Wellington. 92 Hinsley wasted little time in announcing he would only deal with the RC and the parents. 93 The
Repatriation Committee took a hard Francoist line arguing that the evacuations had taken place on false pretences, because Franco had offered a safety zone, that the irregular nature of the evacuation made it impossible to trace many parents, that
Francoist orphanages did not discriminate against the children of the defeated and that many guardians were set on turning the children into 'rabid little communists' and that the youngsters were told 'lurid tales' about General Franco.
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Eager to find a solution, the BCC reached out to the Francoist groups. On 4 October, it proposed the formation of an 'independent and semi-judicial Commission' to 'decide on the merits of each individual request'. The result was the Gregory
Commission which on the evening of 28 October ruled that '500 or more' of the children should be 'embarked at the earliest possible date' accompanied both by Gábana, the officials from the BCC and in liaison with the RC. These BCC representatives should then 'take part in handing over said children'.
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The BCC quickly arranged for the return of the first batch of 160 children on 12
November. The plan envisaged that welfare experts Dr Norman White and Dame Janet Campbell would accompany the children to Bilbao. They were to remain there for a short time 'to arrange for systematic methods of returning those children whose parents are still in Bilbao and have definitely asked for the return of their children'.
Gábana also accompanied the children. The Repatriation Committee, however, intervened with the Spanish authorities and ensured that the BCC representatives could not stay for long. In this way, the RC helped stymie BCC efforts to verify parental requests in Bilbao which the Francoists also scotched by refusing to work with the 'political' Children's Committee.
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Hinsley backed the RC through 1938 as it continued to press its demands to the BCC The documentary record also reveals that the government side prized the special value of children as symbols of Francoist violence behind the lines. The international publicity they produced proved damaging to the Francoists who were seeking belligerent rights and international recognition while seeking to deny atrocities such as Guernica, Badajoz and the murder of Basque priests. Accordingly, while the evacuation represented a major defeat for the Francoists, the repatriation campaign offered an opportunity to nip in the bud government propaganda and to rebuild the insurgents' reputation abroad.
The aims of the PNV, however, went beyond damaging the Francoists'
reputation.Although the Basque nationalists suffer a tarnished reputation, they did boast a long pedigree of humanitarianism and forged a strong reputation in the conflict for seeking to end violence. The PNV also used the children as part of a consistent tactic to secure a propaganda victory as well as to expose and stop the Francoist atrocities both on and behind the lines. Undoubtedly the PNV exploited children for its own ends, but it also battled on behalf of parents who did not want their children to return. In fact, many parents had good reason to object to repatriation. In a number cases they had put their lives on the line to defend PNV or central government ideals and had little desire to see their children brought up in Francoist values. This was particularly the case because large numbers of parents were in exile and unable to look after their children while others suffered jail and poverty. These factors made it more likely that their children would be forced into Francoist care. For its part, the BCC, although overtly partisan recognised the threat to the parental right to control the education of the child and this is a fundamental reason why it opposed indiscriminate repatriation but fully supported discriminate repatriation.
It is clear that Francoists did indeed desire to capture the souls of the children.
Thismeans that we need to locate the repatriation struggle in a wider European conflict over the possession of children and their minds that in recent years has gained more attention from historians. We should, however, exercise caution in doing this.
As we have seen, most of repatriated children returned to their families. An important reason for this was that the BCC forestalled the return of the most vulnerable children.
For the Francoists, however, the wider goal was to repatriate the children of their opponents to Spain where they would place them with their families but re-educate the youngsters in Francoist schools and place them under the gaze of the regime's social workers. Accordingly, we need to take care with Ricard Vinyes' argument about repatriation leading to Francoist care homes. Certainly, many children lay in danger of entering care homes, but many more entered into the orbit of the regime's social services which explicitly aimed to remould the youngsters through a programme of monitoring and re-education. Francoists a revulsion against both the political ideals and the atheism of the parents of many of the children. More than this, they believed that significant numbers of those caring for the children in the UK were damaging the souls of the youngsters.
Accordingly, frustrated by the BCC refusal to hand over the names of the parents, the British advocates argued that if relatives could not be located the children should be repatriated to the Francoist care homes loathed by many parents. They preferred this to leaving the youngsters in the care of the guardians the parents had chosen when they consented to the evacuation. In this sense, they ignored objections of government-supporting parents to the militarism of the regime's education and became caught up in the battle for souls that had developed since the start of the century and which hardened during the Civil War into a crucial part of the conflict.
